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Abstract
This paper argues that through the conceptual distinctions between
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in The Idea of Phenomenology and The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology, a proper understanding of transcendental
idealism and ‘transcendence in immanence’ can avoid any metaphysical
commitments of internalism or externalism, and reconfigure the debate on
internalism and externalism by providing an alternative option. There are
two interpretations towards whether Husserl is an internalist. The first one is
that Husserl is an internalist as he employs the reduction method in order to
‘returns to the inner mind’. The second interpretation, which is most
welcomed by Husserlians, refutes the internalistic interpretation of Husserl
and argues that neither internalism nor externalism can faithfully
understand Husserl’s phenomenology because Husserl’s phenomenology does
not tie to any tradition metaphysical commitment. Although I share this view,
but an important text, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is neglected by
the previous debates. In the text, it does not only reexamine the two levels of
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in The Idea of Phenomenology, but also
introduces one more level of ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’. I shall argue
that by the reconsideration of the three levels of immanence and
transcendence, Husserl does not disconnect ‘transcendence’, so he cannot
simply be employed into internalism, on the one hand; his phenomenology
provides an alternative option rather than internalism or externalism.
Keywords: Phenomenology, Husserl, Internalism, Externalism, Immanence,
Transcendence, Transcendental Idealism, Transcendence in immanence

The conceptual distinctions between ‘internalism’ and
‘externalism’ are applied to moral philosophy, epistemology,
philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Recently,
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Husserl’s phenomenology has been employed into the debate on
internalism and externalism. There are two interpretations.
The first one is greatly influenced by Heideggerian
interpretation of Husserl that Husserl is an internalist
(Carman 2003; Keller 1999). The second interpretation, which
is the most welcomed by Husserlians, refutes the internalistic
interpretation of Husserl and argues that neither internalism
nor externalism can faithfully understand Husserl’s
phenomenology because Husserl’s phenomenology does not tie
to any tradition metaphysical commitment, namely internalism
and externalism (Zahavi 2004, 2008; Crowell 2008;
O’Murchadha 2008). Husserlians within the second camp share
three common beliefs that (1) the doctrine of ‘noema’ is not a
representation,
and
Husserl
does
not
commit
to
representationalism; (2) there is a tight link between Husserl’s
phenomenology and externalism, but they are not equivalent to
each other; (3) Husserl’s proper accounts of intentionality and
reduction lead him to transcendental idealism which is an
alternative option available than internalism or externalism.
While I share these views, Husserl’s distinctions of ‘immanence’
and transcendence’ are drawn by the methodological steps of
the phenomenological reduction. Most of them draw resources
from The Idea of Phenomenology and Transcendental Idealism
(Hua XXXVI). However, an important text, The Basic Problems
of Phenomenology (“Aus den Vorlesungen, Grundprobleme der
Phaenomenologie,
Wintersemester
1910/11”,
in
Zur
Phaenomenologie der Intersubjektivitaet, Hua XIII), is
neglected. In this text, it does not only reexamine the two levels
of ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in The Idea of
Phenomenology, but also introduces one more level of
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’. Through his explication, the
very meaning of “transcendence in immanence” and
transcendental idealism could then be defined. I shall argue
that by the reconsideration of the three levels of immanence
and
transcendence,
Husserl
does
not
disconnect
‘transcendence’, so he cannot simply be employed into
internalism.
The argument shall proceed in five sections. In section one,
after a briefly presentation of how ‘internalism’ and
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‘externalism’ are defined, I shall explain how the first
interpretation employs Husserl’s phenomenology into. In
section two, I shall examine a particular task raised by Husserl
in The Idea of Phenomenology according to which the
traditional understanding of ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’
has to be critically examined. In section three, the importance
of reduction method shall be introduced in order to make a
proper account of intentionality. In section four, Husserl’s
account of the three levels of consciousness and intentionality
shall be explicated. Through the explication of intentionality, in
section five, the three distinctions of ‘immanence’ and
‘transcendence’ shall be drawn and the doctrine of
‘transcendence in immanence’ shall be explained. Finally, I
shall argue Husserl’s transcendental idealism does not only
avoid any metaphysical commitments of internalism or
externalism, but also reconfigure the debate on internalism and
externalism by providing an alternative option.
1. The internalism / externalism
Husserl’s phenomenology

debate

and

Within the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of
language, Hilary Putnam’s definition in “The Meaning of
Meaning” is adopted by debaters. He argues that “meanings
just ain’t in the head” (Putnam 1975, 227). Putnam argues
against the tradition concept of meaning, knowing the meaning
of a word is determined in our mind. He gives a famous “Twin
Earth” thought experiment. Oscar as an Earthian and Twin
Oscar as his Twin Earthian counterpart have alike
psychological states. Oscar and Twin Oscar both have the belief
of what he calls ‘water’. However, Oscar talks of water when he
refers to H2O; Twin Oscar talks of water when he refers to XYZ.
Oscar knows nothing about XYZ while Twin Oscar knows
nothing about H2O. Therefore, Putnam believes that “the
(same) psychological state of the individual speaker does not
determine ‘what he means’” (Putnam 1975, 270). And the thesis
of meaning determining extension/ reference is largely derived
from Frege.
Taylor Carman and Pierre Keller are the scholars who
explicitly argue that Husserl is an internalist. They have two
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META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VI (2) / 2014

basic arguments. First, the reduction is the methodological step
to return to the sphere of internal psychological state. Husserl
strongly emphasizes the necessity of reduction method. Carman
claims that “in methodologically turning away from everything
external to consciousness and focusing instead on what is
internal to it” (Carman 2003, 80). In this interpretation,
Husserl is an internalist in the sense that the reduction method
is appealed to what is internal to consciousness, namely
noemata which is construed as Fregean Sinne (Carman 2003,
68). Therefore, reduction is an evidence for the internalistic
interpretation of Husserl. Second, Husserl shares the similar
feature of most internalists committed to, namely
representationalism. Keller asserts that “the narrow
representational content that we are presented with in our
individual private experiences is the ultimate basis for the
philosophical investigation of the condition under which narrow
and wide content are possible” (Keller 1999, 112). Keller does
not explicitly explain what representational content is, but we
can draw resources from Follesdal and Dreyus who believe
Husserl is a representationalist (Follesdal 1969; Dreyfus 1982).1
They believe that noema is an abstract structure by which the
mind can direct towards external objects. Noematic Sinn is a
complex descriptive sense which is inherent in noema. Since the
abstract character of noema and noematic Sinn is an ideal
medium which can never be regarded as something ‘outer’,
meaning does not have direct connection with the external
world. Therefore, they conclude that the ultimate basis for the
philosophical investigation, in Husserl’s phenomenology, is ‘the
inner’. But does Husserl commit to representationalism? Is
Husserl’s doctrine of ‘immanence’ alike to what they
understand as ‘the inner’ or ‘internal to consciousness’?
2. The critique of traditional distinction between
immanence and transcendence
Before
examining
Husserl’s
distinction
between
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’, we may have a look at
Husserl’s critique towards traditional distinction between
immanence and transcendence, so that we could understand
the aim of the reduction method, a proper account of
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intentionality and the distinctions between ‘immanence’ and
‘transcendence’.
“If we take a closer look at what is so enigmatic about
knowledge, and what causes our predicament in our first
reflection on the possibility of knowledge, we find that it is
transcendence” (Husserl 1999a, 27). When we reflect the
possibility of knowledge, we find that “the enigma about
knowledge is its transcendence” (Husserl 1999a, 33). The
known objects are something other than ‘I’, but how can we
cognize the known objects? It is a long-lasting but important
philosophical question. Husserl in The Idea of Phenomenology
claims that “indeed, our lack of clarity with regard to the sense
or essence of knowledge requires a science of knowledge, a
science that dedicates itself solely to getting clear on the
essence of knowledge” (Husserl 1999a, 25). His aim is to require
a science of knowledge with clarity. But why is it so important
to require clarity? And how do we seek to clarity?
Facing the unsolid ground of epistemology, Husserl
criticizes that “all of the basic errors in epistemology are
connected to the above mentioned μεταβασιζ, on the one hand,
the error of psychologism, and on the other, the error of
anthropologism and biologism. This μεταβασιζ is exceedingly
dangerous” (Husserl 1999a, 31). What does μεταβασιζ mean?
Why is it so dangerous? “μεταβασιζ” means transition. Husserl
introduces an argument that if knowledge which is not in the
genuine sense given, then it is transcendent. If it is
transcendent knowledge, then it has to be critically examined.
All positive knowledge is knowledge that is not examined.
Therefore, all positive knowledge is transcendent knowledge.
Further, psychologism, anthropologism and biologism are
positive knowledge. If epistemology is based upon these, then it
would lead to errors, namely transitions (“μεταβασιζ”).
Husserl proposes two criticisms towards these errors. The
first one is their misunderstanding of transcendence, namely as
physical phenomenon. The second one is critic of their
misunderstanding of relationship between transcendence and
immanence. Firstly, from the perspective of psychologism, it
seeks transcendent object as physical phenomenon. Husserl
argues that “psychical phenomenon” is always quite
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META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VI (2) / 2014

questionable, and frequently misleading. It is because it, on the
one hand, misleads people to say that perceived, imagined,
asserted or desired objects ‘enter consciousnesses’, or to say
that such objects ‘are taken up into consciousness’. On the other
hand, it misleads people to say ‘consciousness’ or ‘the ego’
enters into this or that sort of relation to them, or to say that
intentional experiences ‘contain something as their object in
themselves’ (Husserl 1977, 557). In these senses, it claims that
with different mode of treatment, the same physical
phenomenon can be divided as an ideal object in perception or
the external real physical object perceived.2 We are dealing
with the relationship in which the object’s appearing consists
(the concrete perceptual experience, in which the object itself
seems present to us) and of the object which appears as such.3
Then how does the physical phenomenon can be cognized?
Secondly, from the perspective of anthropologism and
biologism, Husserl criticizes that such expressions promote two
misunderstandings of relationship between transcendence and
immanence. The first misunderstanding claims that “we are
dealing with a real (realen) event or a real (reales) relationship,
taking place between ‘consciousness’ or ‘the ego’… and the thing
of which there is consciousness” (Husserl 1977, 557) The second
misunderstanding claims that “we are dealing with a relation
between two things, both present in equally real fashion (reell)
in consciousness, an act and in intentional object, or with a sort
of box-within-box structure of mental contents” (Husserl 1977,
557) For the first misunderstanding, is it true to say that we
are dealing with a real (realen) event or a real (reales)
relationship? Is the relationship of cognitive contact between
transcendence and immanence a real relationship? How is it
possible? For the second misunderstanding, is it true to say
that we are dealing with a relation between two things, both
present in equally real fashion (reell) in consciousness? Would
the second misunderstanding mix up the act of consciousness
and the conscious object or object of givenness? If so, how can it
draw a distinction between transcendence and immanence?
How is it possible?
Back to the previous question, why is transition
(μεταβασιζ) so dangerous? Husserl explains that “this μεταβασιζ
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is exceedingly dangerous, partly because the proper sense of the
problems never made clear and remains totally lost in it, and
partly because… easily slip back into the temptations of the
natural modes of thinking and judging as well as false and
misleading formulation of the problem which grow on their
basis” (Husserl 1999a, 31). The knowledge of errors in
epistemology, “then, is just human knowledge, bound to the
forms of the human intellect, incapable of making contact with
the very nature of things, with the things themselves” (Husserl
1999a, 18). Therefore, Husserl suggests that this is true in that
no knowledge can be counted as pre-given without examination
at the beginning. He urged to perform epistemological
reduction, “that is, all transcendence that comes into play here
must be excluded… of epistemological nullity” (Husserl 1999a,
30).
3. The introduction of phenomenological reduction
In
epistemological
investigation,
if
objects
as
transcendence are not critically examined, it should not be
utilized as pre-given. In Husserl’s terminology, they are
“epistemologically null” (Husserl 1999a, 34). Husserl asserts
that the first and fundamental part of phenomenology in
general is to attend sole the task of clarifying the essence of
knowledge and known objectivity. In its task of clarifying the
essence of knowledge and known objectivity, phenomenology
designates a science. More importantly, it “designates the
specifically philosophical attitude of thought, the specifically
philosophical
method”
(Husserl
1999a,
19).
The
phenomenological
attitude
first
requires
“free
from
presupposition” (Husserl 1977, 263). How can it achieve the
phenomenological attitude?
“Only through a reduction, which we shall call the
phenomenological reduction, do I acquire an absolutely
givenness that no longer offers anything transcendent” (Husserl
1999a, 34). It shows that Husserl aims at acquiring absolutely
givenness through phenomenological reduction. “Through the
epistemological reduction we exclude all transcendent
presuppositions, because the possible validity and sense of
transcendence is in question” (Husserl 1999a, 37). In this sense,
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the
phenomenological
reduction
can
achieve
the
phenomenological
attitude.
Then
how
does
the
phenomenological reduction perform?
The phenomenological reduction is a way “to alter the
natural attitude radically instead of remaining in this attitude”
(Husserl 1999b, 57). One procedure is the attempt to doubt
universally.4 This doubt “do not give up the positing we
effected”, but the positing undergoes a modification. The
positing remains what it is, but we “put it out of action”, we
“exclude it”, we “parenthesize it” (Husserl 1999a, 59). It is
changing of attitude from taking for granted to critically
examination. Through phenomenological reduction, what can it
remain? Through the reduction, “we shall go as far as is
necessary to effect the insight at which we are aiming, namely
the insight that consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own
which in its own absolute essence, is not touched by the
phenomenological exclusion. It therefore remains as the
“phenomenological residuum”.5 Therefore, Husserl suggested
that the phenomenological way is firstly to “keep our regard
fixed upon the sphere of consciousness and study what we find
immanently within it” (Husserl 1999b, 65). As the first
interpretation mentioned above, Husserl is always interpreted
as ‘internalism’ since through reduction, consciousness remains
as the phenomenological residuum, and attains superior status
comparing to the ‘outer world’.
4. The three concepts of consciousness and the
doctrine of intentionality
In order to avoid the internalistic interpretation, a proper
account of consciousness and intentionality is necessary.
Through phenomenological reduction, Husserl, in Logical
Investigations, uncovers that there are three concepts of
consciousness.6 The first one is consciousness as the entire, real
(reelle) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the
interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of
consciousness (Husserl 1977, 537). The second is consciousness
as the inner awareness of one’s own psychic experience.7 This
third is consciousness as a comprehensive designation for
‘mental acts’, or ‘intentional experiences’, of all sorts.8 For the
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first concept of consciousness, in flux from one moment to the
next, and interconnected and interpenetrating in manifold
ways, experience composes the real unity-of-consciousness of
the individual mind. This concept of consciousness can be seen
in a purely phenomenological manner, which cuts out all
relation to empirically real existence. Take an example, when I
see a red rose, the sense-aspect of color forms a real constituent
of my concrete seeing. It is as much an ‘experienced’ or
‘conscious’ content, as is the character of perceiving, or as the
full perceptual appearing of the colored object. In this sense, “as
belonging in a conscious connection, the appearing of things is
experienced by us, as belonging in the phenomenal world,
things appear before us. The appearing of the things does not
itself appear to us, we live through it” (Husserl 1977, 538). We
can draw a distinction: the relation of the phenomenal object
(conscious content) and the phenomenal subject (empirical
person, a thing) is different from the relation of a conscious
content in the sense of an experience and consciousness in the
sense of a unity of such conscious contents. The former relation
concerns with the relation of two appearing things. The latter
relation concerns with the relation of a single experience to a
complex of experiences.9
For the second concept of consciousness, it is expressed by
talk of ‘inner consciousness.’ Husserl asserts that ‘inner
perception’ is “to accompany actually present experiences and
to relate to them as its object” (Husserl 1977, 542). The ‘selfevidence’ usually attributed to inner perception shows it to be
adequate perception. It is because this adequate perception
ascribes nothing to its object that is not intuitively presented
but intuitively presents and posits its objects just as they are in
fact experienced in and with their perception. In this sense, the
intentional perception corresponds with complete perfection,
achieves adequacy. It is therefore itself a real (reell) factor in
our perceiving of it. Therefore, we can draw a distinction: inner
perception as the perception of one’s own experiences and inner
perceptions adequate or evident perception.
The second concept of consciousness refers to inner
consciousness or inner perception. It is about the perception of
one’s own experience and adequate or evident perception. To
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bear a point in mind, Husserl’s inner perception is different
from Brentano’s as he strong emphasizes. It is because in
Husserl’s
interpretation,
Brentano’s
inner
perception
reproduces what is ‘in’ the mind (inexistence), but Husserl’s
inner perception is a reflection upon the pre-reflective
experiences. Inner perception does not reproduce, on the one
hand; it does not bring something ‘in’ our mind out. Instead,
inner perception is conscious of pre-reflective experience, so it is
‘the perception of one’s own experience’. The first concept of
consciousness refers to the real unity-of-consciousness of the
individual mind composed by experience and content. It is
about the relation of two appearing things and the relation of a
single experience to a complex of experiences. The second
concerns with single experience but the first concerns with the
relation of a single experience to a complex of experiences. On
the one hand, Husserl, therefore, described that “undeniably
the second concept of consciousness is the more ‘primitive’: it
has an ‘intrinsic priority’” (Husserl 1977, 543). On the other
hand, the second concept and the first concept show that the
unity of the concrete phenomenological whole coexists. These
‘unities of coexistence’ pass continuously from one into next,
composing a unity of change, of the stream of consciousness.
“This accordingly forms the phenomenological content of the
ego, of the empirical ego in the sense of the physic subject.
Phenomenological reduction yields the really self-enclosed,
temporally growing unity of the stream of experience. The
notion of experience has widened out from what is inwardly
perceived, and that is in this sense conscious, to the notion of
the ‘phenomenological ego’, by which the empirical ego is
intentionally constituted” (Husserl 1977, 545). Up to this
moment, we understand the first and second concept articulate
to the phenomenological ego, but how can we draw such
concept? Precisely, what is the condition of possibility for us to
draw the first and second concepts of consciousness?
Here, the third concept of consciousness has to be
introduced. It is defined in terms of ‘acts’ or ‘intentional
experiences.’ In such intentional experience, “things seized in
their phenomenological purity, furnish concrete bases for
abstracting the fundamental notions. There are acts ‘trained
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upon’ the character of acts in which something appears, or
there are acts trained upon the empirical ego and its relation to
the object. “The phenomenological kernel of the empirical ego
here consists of acts which bring objects to its notice, acts in
which the ego directs itself to the appropriate object” (Husserl
1977, 550). To be specific, intentional relation, understood in
purely descriptive fashion as an inward peculiarity of certain
experiences, is the essential feature of ‘physical phenomenon’ or
‘acts’. In this sense, Husserl accepted Brentano’s definition of
intentional relation as “phenomenon intentionally containing
objects in themselves a circumscription of essence” (Husserl
1977, 555). But there are differences between them.
Firstly, Brentano believes that intentional experiences
direct themselves to the presented objects. The direction is in an
intentional sense. It seems there are two things present in
intentional experience. Unlike Brentano’s doctrine of
intentionality, Husserl clarifies that “there are not two things
present in experience, we do not experience the object and beside
it the intentional experience directed upon it… only one thing is
present, the intentional experience” (Husserl 1977, 558).
Secondly, as mentioned previously, the perceived physical
object is not ‘in’ consciousness like Brentano’s claim. Husserl
gives an example of having an idea of God Jupiter, the idea of
God Jupiter is a particular sort of experience, but not “part of
the descriptive or real make-up (deskriptiven reellen Bestand)”
(Husserl 1977, 559). The idea of God is neither ‘inside’
consciousness nor ‘outside’ consciousness as it does not exist at
all. It is an ‘intentional’ object rather than something
‘immanent’ or ‘internal’.
Through drawing distinction between Brentano and
Husserl, we will find that he essential descriptive character of
the intentional experience is intentionality. Intentionality, in
previous description, means “conscious of”, “refer to” or “aim
at”. If intentional experience is present, then through its own
essence, the intentional ‘relation’ to an object is achieved, and
an object is ‘intentionally present’; these two phrases mean
precisely the same. In this sense, objects is not ‘internal’, but
“are only intentional, only an object of consciousness, something
presented (Vorstelliges) in the manner peculiar to
473
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consciousness, something apparent <as apparent> (Husserl
1999b, 113).
5. The doctrine of intentionality and the conceptual
distinction between immanence and transcendence
In the analysis of the structure of experience, “the
qualifying adjective ‘intentional’ names the essence common to
the class of experience” (Husserl 1977, 562). It shows that our
structure of experience is always intentional. Through the
doctrine of intentionality, we understand that “an experience
may be present in consciousness together with its intention,
although its object does not exist at all, and is perhaps
incapable of existence. The object is ‘meant’, i.e. to ‘mean’ it is
an experience, but it is then merely entertained in thought, and
is nothing in reality” (Husserl 1977, 558). Take having an idea
of God as an example, if I have an idea of Christian God, this
Christian is my presented object, he is ‘immanently present’ in
my act or experience. It means I have a certain presentative
experience, the presentation of the Christian God is realized in
my consciousness. Husserl explains what ‘immanent’ is:
“The ‘immanent’, ‘mental object’ is not therefore part of the
descriptive or real make-up (deskriptiven reellen Bestand) of the
experience, it is in truth not really immanent or mental. These
so-called immanent contents are therefore merely intended or
intentional, while truly immanent contents, which belong to the
real make-up (reellen Bestand) of the intentional experiences, are
not intentional: they constitute the act, provide necessary points
d’appui which render possible an intention, but are not
themselves intended, not the objects presented in the act.”
(Husserl 1977, 559)

Here we can draw the first conceptual distinction between
transcendence and immanence. This distinction can be found in
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Husserl claims that the
sense of transcendence is that “the object of knowledge itself is
not present in the act of knowledge… It belongs to the essence of
the intentional relation (being just the relation between
consciousness and the object of consciousness) that
consciousness, i.e., the respective cogitatio, is consciousness
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about something that what it is not” (Husserl 2006, 64). This
conceptual distinction articulates to the real make-up (reellen
Bestand) of the intentional experiences. Immanent is relative to
intentional. The ‘immanence’ refers to that real make-up (reellen
Bestand) of the intentional experience. In this sense, the
‘transcendence’ refers to that the intentional object, which is not
really (reell) immanent. Therefore, Husserl, in The Idea of
Phenomenology, explicitly describes that:
“It (transcendence) can refer to the fact that the known object
is not really (reell) contained in the act of knowing. In this
case, ‘given in the genuine sense’ or ‘immanently given’ would
be understood in terms of real (reelle) containment: the act of
knowing, the cogitation, has real (reelle) moments that really
(reell) constitute it…Here ‘immanent’ means ‘really (reell)
immanent to the experience of knowing’.” (Husserl 1999a, 27)

The first conceptual distinction between transcendence and
immanence are drawn. It refers to the condition of possibility of
experience of knowing, namely intentional experience.
The second type refers to the adequacy of knowledge. The
distinction results when we regard it as a classification of
individual objects. Husserl asserts that according to this,
“individual objects break down into those which could be given
intuitively in absolute self-presence and those which can only
appear as self-present” (Husserl 2006, 65). In the footnote,
Husserl explains that the former could have existed only as
having been perceived and they can be potentially recalled; the
latter could have existed before all perception. How could these
be understood? The very distinction between them is the
change of attitude. Those which can only appear as selfpresence but not absolute self-presence remain in the natural
attitude. Husserl regards them as transcendent. In a contrary,
“every phenomenological consciousness is related to
immanence; the immanent is the field of phenomenology”
(Husserl 2006, 65). Through reduction method, this meaning of
‘immanence’ could then be drawn as phenomenological
reduction as a methodological step ‘creates’ the field of
phenomenology, namely the second sense of ‘immanence’. If we
understand the second sense of transcendence refers to objects
which can only appear as self-presence and the second of
475
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‘immanence’ refers to object which can be given intuitively in
absolute self-presence, then we may ask what the essential
features of this sense of ‘immanence’ is? What is the meaning of
‘absolute self-presence?
In The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl explains that,
“But there is another sense of transcendence, whose counterpart
is an entirely different kind of ‘immanence’, namely absolute and
clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense. This
givenness, which excludes any meaningful doubt, consists of an
immediate act of seeing and apprehending the meant objectivity
itself as it is. It constitutes the precise concept of evidence,
understood as immediate evidence. All knowledge that is not
evident, that refers to or posits what is objective, but does not see
it for itself, is transcendent in this second sense. In such
knowledge we go beyond what is given in the genuine sense,
beyond what can be directly seen and apprehended.” (Husserl
1999a, 28)

Precisely, ‘immanence’ refers to that is absolute and clear
givenness, self-givenness in the pure phenomenological sense.
This givenness, which excludes any meaningful doubt, consists
of an immediate act of seeing and apprehending the meant
objectivity itself as it is. “Absolute givenness” refers to “seeing,
grasping what is self-given, insofar as it is an actual seeing that
presents an actual self-givenness and not a givenness that
refers to something not given-that is something ultimate. This
is absolute self-givenness (absolute Selbstverständlichkeit)”
(Husserl 1999a, 38). It is relative to inadequate and unclear
givenness, not self-givenness. “Transcendence” refers to
inadequate and unclear givenness, not self-givenness in pure
phenomenological sense. On the first case, this conceptual
distinction articulates to reflective thinking and the second
concept of consciousness as the inner awareness of one’s own
psychic experience. When we reflect on our inner awareness of
one’s own previous perceptual experience, it is adequate
givenness if we can consist of an immediate act of seeing and
apprehending the meant objectivity itself as it is. It is
inadequate givenness if we cannot consist of an immediate act
of seeing and apprehending the meant objectivity itself as it is
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or the meant objectivity itself is posited rather than selfgivenness.
Apart from the two distinctions mentioned above, there
is the third ways of understanding ‘immanence’ and
transcendence which cannot be found in The Idea of
Phenomenology, but The Basic Problems of Phenomenology
only. ‘Immanence’ refers to which is present in the flesh to
consciousness, and transcendence refers to which is meant
without such self-presence. Husserl explains what he means,
“On the side of immanence is only that which is seen (and, at
the most, one could also say that the seeable of this kind is so
united with the actual seen that a change in the reflective
stance could lead from the one to the other), whereas on the
side of transcendence would everything else, foremost
everything non-present, albeit as an object of consciousness.”
(Husserl 2006, 64)

During this lecture in 1910-1911, Husserl delivered the timeconsciousness lecture already. In the lecture, he uncovers the
importance of retention. “As reflection [reduction] makes clear,
the vitally present seeing is one with the vitally present seen.”
(Husserl 2006, 64) These two constitute the unity of the
present. However, even if retention reproduces something
which had been seen, this remembered or reproduced
memories is meant without its self-presence but is meant as a
presence of absence. Therefore, it would be transcendent to the
present remembering consciousness. In this sense, Husserl is
true to say that “phenomenology does not want to disconnect
transcendence in every sense” (Husserl 2006, 65).
On the one hand, reduction is a methodological step that
draws the three distinctions between ‘immanence’ and
transcendence. On the other hand, the reduction method
guarantees a proper understanding of ‘immanence’ and
transcendence. ‘Immanence’ as the field of phenomenology
does not disconnect transcendence, but constitutes
transcendence in a proper way. As Jan Patočka in An
Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology well explicated, “the
task of phenomenology is not to eliminate all objectivity but to
ground objectivity itself in immanence… here the third stage
begins, from absolute immanence to the discovery of
477
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transcendence in immanence” (Patočka 1996, 92-3). It means
that phenomenology as special method and special thought of
attitude, through the methodological steps, demonstrates how
transcendence is correlated to immanence.
To summarize the distinction, the first distinction is a
classification of intentionality. The ‘immanence’ refers to that
real make-up (reellen Bestand) of the intentional experience.
The ‘transcendence’ refers to that the intentional object, which
is not really (reell) immanent. Objects as transcendence are
only intentional, only an intentional object of intentional
experience. The second distinction is a classification of
individual objects. The ‘immanence’ refers to those which can be
given intuitively in absolute and clear self-givenness in the
pure phenomenological sense. The ‘transcendence’ refers to
those which can only appear as self-present in natural attitude.
The third distinction is a classification of presentation.
‘Immanence’ refers to which is present in the flesh to
consciousness. The ‘transcendence’ refers to which is meant
without such self-presence. These can be derived as following:
Before phenomenological reduction
Transcendence (3): objects which is meant without such selfpresence
Transcendence (2): objects which can only appear as self-present in
natural attitude
After phenomenological reduction
Immanence (3): objects which is present in the flesh to
consciousness
Immanence (2): which can be given intuitively in absolute selfgivenness
Immanence (1): Real make-up (essential Transcendence (1):
structure) of consciousness
Intentional objects

More important, we could find two important points in
Husserl’s phenomenology. First, the distinction is guided by the
reduction method. Second, phenomenology does not disconnect
transcendence in every sense. For example, I hear a tone A in
pre-reflective state which is in the natural attitude. The tone is
transcendent object in the second sense. Through the reduction,
the tone A is reflected and is brought to immanence through the
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disengagement of natural attitude. The tone A is now ‘in’ the
field of phenomenology. But it is still transcendent in the first
sense as it is not the essential structure of consciousness but
the object pole of an intentional experience. More important,
through the reduction method, the past tone A which is
thematically reflected and reproduced as a presence of the
absence, as it were. It is the third sense of transcendence as it
is meant without presence as presence. The relationship can be
derived the following schema which is suggested by Rudolf
Boehm (1965) with modification:

The schema shows that ‘pure’ or ‘phenomenological’ immanence
does not exclude all real transcendence. Instead, it connects
intentional immanence with is a real transcendence. That’s the
very meaning of ‘transcendence in immanence’. Therefore,
Husserl could not simply be employed into internalism as
Husserl’s doctrine of immanence is not an enclosed box-likemind.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, through the explications of three levels of
the distinction between immanence and transcendence, we will
find that Husserl’s phenomenology does not commit to any
metaphysical presupposition of internalism and externalism.
One the one hand, Husserl’s doctrine of ‘immanence’ and
‘transcendence’ does not equivalent to ‘internalism’ and
‘externalism’. Immanence does not mean the ‘inner’ or internal
mind or object ‘in’ the self-contained box-like-mind which
disconnects to the ‘external’ world. Instead, through the
reduction, transcendent object is reflected and is constituted.
Paul Ricoeur, in Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology,
well formulates that “as it appears to a consciousness, one can
say that the object transcends that consciousness and likewise
that the object is in that consciousness; but it is there
specifically by virtue of being intentional and not by virtue of
being a really inherent part of consciousness” (Ricoeur 1967, 8).
On the other hand, Husserl does not share the same features of
representationalism. As his criticisms of Brentano in Logical
Investigations, there are not two things present in experience,
but only one thing is present, the intentional experience.
Through the reduction method, what is given intuitively is not
representation ‘in’ our mind, but is direct to the experience as it
were. It is clear that transcendental phenomenology firstly
signifies a special method and attitude of thought. And “the
reduction less and less signifies a ‘return to the ego’ and more
and more ‘return from logic to antepredicative’, to the
primordial evidence of the world” (Ricoeur 1967, 12). Therefore,
Husserl’s phenomenology could hardly be identified as
internalist, but provides an alternative option towards the
debate.

NOTES
1 In this paper, I am not going to criticize the interpretation. Please refer to
Drummond, 1990.
2 “Real” and “Reell” are two different concepts. “Real” is relative to “ideal”.
Real object refers to physical object, namely trees and tables. Ideal object
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refers to concept, namely number and theories. “Reel” is relative to
“intentional”. Consciousness contains reell content and intentional content.
The reell content of consciousness refers to “the act of consciousness”. The
intentional content of consciousness refers to “conscious object” and the way of
givenness.
3 It is because the difference between a conscious content in perception and
the external object perceived in it (perception), is a mere difference in mode of
treatment between, the same appearance being at one time dealt with in a
subjective connection (in connection with appearances which relate to an ego),
and at other time in an objective connection (in connection with the things
themselves) (Husserl 1977, 538).
4 Husserl emphasizes that there is difference between Cartesian universal
doubt and his phenomenological reduction. “We start from here, but at the
time emphasize that the attempt to doubt universally shall serve us only as a
methodic expedient for picking out certain points which, as included in its
essence, can be brought to light and made evident by means of it” (Husserl
1999b, 58). Husserl emphasized the difference between Cartesian universal
doubt and his phenomenological reduction because Cartesian universal doubt
is a method of negating positing or something doubtful. But universal doubt
as a procedure of the phenomenological reduction effects a certain annulment
of positing. The annulment in question is not a transmutation of positing into
counter positing, of position into negation (Husserl 1999b, 58).
5 “The phenomenological reduction will deserve its name only by means of this
insight; the fully conscious effecting of that reduction will prove itself to be
the operation necessary to make ‘pure’ consciousness, and subsequently the
whole phenomenological region, accessible to us” (Husserl 1999b, 65-6). It
shows that the phenomenological residuum is pure consciousness. But bear a
point in mind, pure consciousness is not a box-like-mind, but the whole
phenomenological region or the field of phenomenology.
6 Rudolf Bernet and Theodorus de Boer argue that the term of epoché and
reduction first appeared in 1907, but Husserl performed reduction method
since Logical Investigations (See Husserl 1985, XX; de Boer 1995, 362-3).
7 By the first and second concepts of consciousness, “not only is it evident that
I am: self-evidence also attaches countless judgments of the form I perceive
this or that, where I not merely think, but am also self-evidently assured, that
what I perceive is given as I think of it, that I apprehend the thing itself, and
for what it is” (Husserl 1977, 544).
8 In phenomenological sense, “there are acts ‘trained upon’ the character of
acts in which something appears, or there are acts trained upon the empirical
ego and its relation to the object.” (Husserl 1977, 550). It means that “the
empirical ego consists of acts which bring objects to its notice, acts in which
the ego directs itself to the appropriate object” (Husserl 1977, 550).
9 See Husserl 1977, 538-9. To have a better understanding of the singlecomplex or part-whole logic in Husserl, please refer to Solowoski 1977.

481

META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VI (2) / 2014

REFERENCES
Boehm,
R.
1965.
“Basic
Phenomenological Reduction.”
Quarterly 5 (2): 183-202.

Reflections
on
Husserl’s
International Philosophical

Carman, T. 2003. Heidegger’s analytic. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Crowell, S. 2008. “Phenomenological immanence, normativity
and semantic externalism.” Synthese 160: 335-354.
de Boer, T. 1978. The development of Husserl’s thought.
Translated by T. Plantiga. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Dreyfus, H. 1982. “Husserl’s perceptual noema.” In Husserl,
intentionality and cognitive science, edited by Hubert L.
Dreyfus, 97-124. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Drummond, J. 1990. Husserlian intentionality and nonfoundational realism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Follesdal, D. 1969. “Husserl’s notion of noema.” The Journal of
Philosophy 66: 680-687.
Husserl, E. 1977. Logical Investigations. Volume 2. Translated
by J.N. Findlay. New York: The Humanities Press.
Husserl, E. 1985. Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren
Zeitbewußtseins (1893-1917). Edited by R. Bernet. Frankfurt
am Main: Meiner.
Husserl, E. 1999a. The Idea of Phenomenology. Translated by L.
Hardy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. 1999b. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. Translated
by F. Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. 2006. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: From
the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1010-1911. Translated by I.
Farin and J.G. Hart. Dordrecht: Springer.
Keller, P. 1999. Husserl and Heidegger on human experience.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O’Murchadha, F. 2008. “Reduction, externalism and immanence
in Husserl and Heidegger.” Synthese 160: 375-395.
482

Tang Man To / Husserl’s Trancendental Idealism

Patočka, J. 1996. An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology.
Translated by J. Dodd. Illinois: Open Court.
Putnam, H. (1975). “The meaning of ‘meaning’.” In Mind,
language and reality, Vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers, 215-271.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ricoeur, P. 1976. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Sokolowski, R. 1977. “The Logic of Parts and Wholes in
Husserl’s Investigations.” In Readings on Husserl’s Logical
Investigations, edited by J. Mohanty, 94-111. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff.
Zahavi, D. 2003. Husserl’s phenomenology. California: Stanford
University Press.
Zahavi, D. 2004. “Husserl’s noema and the internalismexternalism debate.” Inquiry 47 (1): 42-66.
Zahavi, D. 2008. “Internalism, externalism, and transcendental
idealism.” Synthese 160: 355-374.

Tang Man To, assistant college lecturer in Community College at Lingnan
University, PhD Candidate in Philosophy. Bachelor degree and Master of
Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He worked as a tutor for
courses like the History of Western Philosophy, Logic and Critical Thinking,
Philosophy of Love and Contemporary French Philosophy.
Address:
Tang Man To
Community College, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
Department of Philosophy
Staff Room 1, Tsim Sha Tsui Education Centre
Tel: (852) 23696334
Email: mttang@ln.edu.hk

483

